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ABSTRACT 
This paper is an attempt to provide an updated assessment of what we know and 
what do not know about the impact of monetary policy on the economy and what 
implications follow for the conduct of monetary policy in today's world. Firstly, we 
discuss the conditions under which monetary policy can be expected to affect 1I1e 
economy, both over the medium term and the short term, and review the most 
policy-relevant empirical results, providing some new evidence. SecOndly, we 
analyze the implications that the empirical regularities have for the practical conduct 
of monetary policy. We focus on whether the existence of short-run real effects can 
and should be exploited by central banks and whether the impact of monetary 
policy on the economy may be affected by the present circumstances of low rates 




The impact of monetary policy on the economy and in particular on output 
and prices has long been a key issue in macroeconomic theory. It is also of 
fundamental importance from a policy perspective given how necessary it is for 
central bankers to have a proper understanding of Ihe consequences of their 
actions so as to determine at each moment whal monetary stance is appropriate for 
reaching their final goal. 
This paper attempts to address the question of what are the real effects of 
monetary policy. Although one might be templed at first sight to give a more or less 
conclusive standard macroeconomics textbook answer drawing on popular 
perceptions about what monetary policy does, on reflection things are not so 
simple. 
Firstly, when we talk about the impact of monetary policy on the economy a 
distinction has to be drawn between the shorter term and the medium term: indeed, 
the effects of monetary actions on nominal and real variables can -and generally 
will- differ considerably depending on the r�ference horizon. 
Secondly, when we ask 'what is the impact of a 1 p.p. change in the official 
interest rate by the central bank?', it may be important to consider that while 
monetary policy may affect the economy it also reacts to it. For this reason, it is of 
interest to differentiate whether such policy action is an unexpected or exogenous 
shock or is rather part of an explicit or implicit policy rule whereby the central bank 
systematically responds to evolving economic conditions in the pursuit of its final 
goals. 
Thirdly, while in central bankers' jargon an increase in the official interest 
rate is always taken to mean a policy "tightening" and a reduction a policy 
"loosening", measuring the stance of monetary policy is no trivial task. For instance, 
a rise in official interest rates in response to a prospective worsening in price 
developments may ultimately be "accommodating' in so far as the nominal interest 
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rate increase is not as large as' the increase in inflationary expectations, thus letting 
real interest rates drop at a time when they should rather be increasing to counter 
future inflationary pressures. 
Finally, the effects of monetary policy on the economy do not take place in a 
vacuum. Rather, they critically depend on what the starting conditions are 
regarding, for example, the credibility of the central bank's policy, the degree of 
economic slack, the functioning of goods and labour markets, the initial rate of 
inflation and the initial level of interest rates. 
Keeping these considerations in mind, this paper attempts to provide an 
updated assessment of what we know -and what we still do not- about the impact of 
monetary policy on the economy, and what implications follow for the conduct of 
monetary policy in today's world'. In so doing, our main aim is to bring together 
economic principles, empirical evidence and central banking experience so as to 
derive some practical lessons which may be useful to performers of the "art of 
central banking". 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the key conceptual 
issues that have to be dealt with when studying the conditions under which 
monetary policy can be expected to affect real economic activity. It presents what 
we consider to be the most policy-relevant empirical results on the impact of 
monetary policy on the economy over the short and medium term and provides 
further results for the euro area using two alternative models. The section 
concludes with a critical look at the existing evidence and with an assessment of 
the empirical regularities which seem most robust and thus useful for policymaking. 
Section 3 takes stock of the results in the previous section and focuses on 
the implications that the empirical regularities have for the practical conduct of 
monetary policy. An initial issue concerns the risks incurred when monetary policy 
is repeatedly employed as a tool for trying to influence real economic activity 
without due regard to the maintenance of price stability. A second issue deals with 
the practical lessons than can be drawn from the evidence regarding the deSign of 
1 In a recenl paper, Friedman (1995) also addresses these issues. 
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monetary policy frameworks. The last part o! the section addresses the issue of 
whether the impact of monetary policy on the economy may differ under 
circumstances like the present ones, characterised by very low rates of inflation and 
nominal and real interest rates. Section 4 completes the paper, summarising its 
main conclusions. 
2. THE IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY ON THE ECONOMY IN THEORY 
AND IN PRACTICE 
In discussing the impact of monetary policy on the economy. modern 
macroeconomics draws a distinction between the short and the medium term. This 
distinction is essential for a proper understanding of what monetaiy policy does. In 
the short term, price and output dynamics are likely to be quite complex due to the 
potential presence of certain frictions and market imperfections. By contrast, in the 
medium term certain conditions hold which greatly simplify the analysis. For this 
reason. we start with the medium term and then move to the short term. In both 
cases the main conceptual elements are presented and the empirical evidence is 
reviewed2. 
2.1. The medium tenn 
A most firmly established behavioural relationship in monetary theory is that 
which links in the medium term the inflation rate. the growth of output and the rate 
of money growth. This relationship states that, on average, the rate of monetary 
expansion finances the trend growth of output and the sustained increase in the 
general price level. Thus, the inflation rate equals, on average, the rate of monetary 
expansion which exceeds that which is needed to finance the potential growth in 
the economy'. 
While the above relationship necessarily .holds in any economy. regardless 
of its economic structure, the concrete monetary policy strategy adopted by the 
authorities or the specific features of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, 
something else is needed to tum it into an explanation of the long-run effects of 
2 This section partially draws on Vi"als (1998) 3 To be precise, trend changes in velocity should also enter into the relationship. 
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monetary policy in the economy. This "something else" is nothing more than the 
widely shared view that there is no medium-tenm trade-off that the authorities can 
exploit for increasing output at the cost of higher inflation. This general result 
hinges, in turn, on two very reasonable assumptions: that regardless of what the 
short-run situation is, economic agents eventually Jearn from their past mistakes 
and end up having a pretty good idea of how the economy works and, in particular, 
of the monetary policy being followed; and that prices and wages become fully 
flexible over time thus making it possible for goods and labour markets to fully clear. 
While the above implies that over the medium term inflation is primarily a 
monetary phenomenon, and that central banks cannot increase output through 
engineering higher inflation, it must also be acknowledged that inflation may 
actually be detrimental to economic activity. Indeed, the belief that inflation entails 
costs to society's economic well-being is certainly behind the widespread 
acceptance of the principle that the best contribution that monetary policy can make 
to society is to maintain an environment of price stability over the medium term. 
As concerns the economic costs of inflation, it is generally assumed that 
such costs arise when the economy deviates over a prolonged time from what is a 
situation of price stability. Along with the well-known "shoe-leather" and "menu 
costs", the most important costs are those that arise as a result of the impact of 
inflation within a tax, legal and contiractual framework which is not fully adapted to rt. 
In addition to these macroeconomic and efficiency costs, when inflation affects the 
public's economic entitlements and obligations, a significant redistribution of income 
and wealth ensues which tends to affect adversely those segments of society with 
less knowledge and fewer resources to protect themselves against inflation. 
Turning now to the empirical evidence, we first provide some justification for 
inflation being primarily a monetary phenomenon over the medium term and then 
briefly discuss what evidence there is on the costs of inflation. 
Most studies confinm that over the medium tenm there is an extremely high 
correlation (almost unity) between the growth rate of the money supply and the 
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inflation rate". Since in the present circumstances of deregulation and continuous 
financial innovation it is often difficult to identify which specific monetary aggregate 
corresponds most closely to the relevant concept of "money" or "liquidity", it is 
comforting that the above results hold for altemative definitions of "money". We 
have also looked at national macroeconomic trends with a view to evaluating how 
important monetary developments are in explaining cross-country diffierences in 
inflation over extended periods, taking into account that the inflation rate equals, on 
average, the rate of monetary expansion which exceeds the needs for financing the 
medium-term growth of the economy. This confirms th'at the exisbng differences 
among national inflation rates are mainly accounted for by different rates of 
expansion of liquidity in the various countries. This fact comes as no surprise if it is 
borne in mind that, generally speaking, average output growth rates recorded in 
highly diverse economies fluctuate within a fairly limited range -particularly in the 
industrial countries- while, by contrast rates of monetary expansion vary 
considerably. To illustrate this point, Figure 1 shows the various inflation rates 
registered, on average, in the industrial countries over the last thirly years. Figure 2 
displays the positive relationship between inflation and the rate of monetary growth 
in this group of countries during the period under considerabon. 
While this body of preliminary evidence is consistent with the traditional 
interpretation that it is monetary developments which lead to sustained price 
changes, in pradice it may also occur that inflation is initially triggered by non­
monetary factors (such as oil price shocks). Still, inflation cannot go on permanently 
unless it is accommodated by money creation5. 
As regards the available evidence regarding the size of the economic costs of 
inflation, most of the existing analyses usually start from the assumpbon that, 
regardless of the ways in which inflation may adversely affect an economy, to be 
costly it should undermine per capita income over the medium term. Given the 
diversity of approaches, geographical coverage and time frame of the existing 
empirical studies, rt should come as no surprise that their resurts diffier considerably. 
Admittedly, most of these studies may be criticised owing to the fact that inflation and 
• See the recent sUf\ley by McCandless and Webert (1995). and also Lucas (1996). 
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growth are mutually determined variables in a general equilibrium framework. 
However, the results generated by those cross-country studies having a theoretical 
framework more firmly anchored in growth theory generally conclude that countries 
which enter into an inflationary process, even at moderate rates, never see an 
improvement in per-capita income prospects and have a h�h probability of 
experiencing a deterioration in such prospects'. 
Very recentty, the question of whether reducing infiation to go to price stability 
is also beneficial when starting from relatively low rates of inflation has been the 
subject of intense research. In particular, rt is worth mentioning a recent study under 
the aegis of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBERl'. The NBER project 
tries to approximate empirically on a country-bY-<Xluntry basis the net benefits of going 
from low inflation to price stability. The general conclusion is that industrial countries 
tend to experience in net terms Significant welfare gains when achieving price stability 
even if the starting inflation rates are moderate, say, 4 to 5%. Consequentty, rt is our 
view that the empirical evidence is overall consistent with the widespread public 
perception that inflation erodes standards of living and economic welfare. 
In sum, because, over the medium term, inflation is primarily a monetary 
phenomenon and because inflation entails significant economic costs, this axplains 
the monetary authorities' concern, even in countries. which have adopted highly 
divergent monetary policy arrangements, with reaching a rate of liquidity creation 
that is compatible with financing potential economic growth under conditions of 
price stability in the medium term. 
2.2. The short tenn 
It is in the discussion of the short-term effects of monetary policy where the 
complexities arise. In principle, in a world where prices and wages are fully flexible 
instantaneously, so that goods and labour markets clear continuously, and where 
private agents are reasonably well informed about the workings of the economy and 
S An alternative view, which postulates a fiscallheory of price level determination, has recently been proposed by 
Woodford (1996). According 10 this view, prices are detel1Tlined by the condition that the intertemporal govemment 
�udget constraint must be satisfied. 
For recent surveys of the economic costs of inflation, see Fischer (1994). See Andres and Hernando (1999) for 
new results. 7 See Feldstein (1999) 
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the nature of the policies implemented by the authorities, the medium term result 
also applies to the short tenm: monetary policy influences prtces but leaves real 
economic conditions unaffected8. 
Nevertheless, central banks know too well that, unfortunately, the reality is 
far from this idealised world, as revealed, for example, by the interest with which 
monetary policy decisions are awaited by the public, which would be very hard to 
justify if money were "just a veil". Moreover, the presumption that monetary policy 
has, at least under normal conditions, real effects on the economy over short 
horizons is rooted in the empirical evidence that we will be discussing later in the 
paper. The attempts theoretically to justify this presumpUon have been most 
important in furthering macroeconomics over the years9. 
For the school of thought that believes that prices and wages are fully 
flexible in the short tenm, the main reason why monetary policy has temporary real 
effects is that � leads to mispenceptions on the part of the public. Therefore, in so 
far as agents make approprtate use of all the infonmation available to them to form 
expectations, monetary policy will have real effects only when it is unantiCipated. As 
originally stated by Milton Friedman, Edmund Phelps and Robert Lucas monetary 
policy moves which are not anticipated by the public lead agents to misinterpret 
changes in the price level as changes in relative prices and therefore to modify their 
economic behaviour'0, While in the short run this would be reflected in an 
insufficient adjustment of the general price level to the new prevailing monetary 
conditions and in a change in output, once agents learn and modify their 
expectations over time prices will eventually adjust fully and output will return to 
equilibrium in the medium tenm. By contrast, when monetary policy actions are fully 
expected by the public, agents will take this information into aocount when making 
decisions and monetary actions will lead to a full and instantaneous movement in 
the price level without any short-nun output effects . 
• In what follows, it should be understood that monetary policy actions do not affect real variables over the medium 
term unless they permanently affect the rate of inflation. 
f For synthetic but ve�useful recent explanation of the main conceptual issues behind the existence of short·term monetary non-neutral! see, among others , Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Romer (1996), Mankiw and Romer 
P991) and Walsh (199 ). 
'1"he original contributions are those of Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968), and they were subsequently theoretically founded b� Lucas (1972). In later yearshreal business cycle models, like those building on the ideas of Kvdland and Prescott 1982), attempted to explain t e economy as driven by real as opposed to monetary factors, although as of late sue models are also integrating monetary developments. 
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The immediate policy implications from the above are twofold: firstly, only 
monetary policy actions which are not systematic have a short-run influence on 
output, with a monetary loosening leading to an output expansion and viceversa; 
and secondly, systematic policy changes -which by definition are anticipated by the 
public- influence prices but not output in the short tenm. Consequently, the choice of 
the policy rule by the monetary authorities is of no consequence for short-run output 
developments, thus mattering only for price developments 11. 
A problem with the practical relevance of the results from the 'flexible price­
imperfect infonma�on' school is that it is hard to reconcile them with the facts. In 
particular, it is not easy to explain why monetary policy actions lead to a gradual 
adjustment of prices which lasts well after agents have become fully infonmed about 
the nature of such actions. Moreover, in practice, � tums out that monetary policy 
decisions lead to adjustments in instruments -like official interest rates- which do 
not behave enra�cally but follow smooth paths that are correlated over the business 
cycle with macroeconomic variables". Yet while this would suggest that most policy 
a�o'ns can be interpreted as systematic responses to the state of the economy 
rather than as exogenous policy shifts, according to the above-men�oned school 
only the 'non-systematic' part matters for the course of short-run output". It thus 
becomes very difficult to understand why the public shows so much concem with 
monetary decisions, which in most cases are a systematic response to economic 
developments in pursuit of the central bank's final goal. 
Property understanding what happens in the real world becomes very 
difficult � it is not acknowiedged that wages and prices are not fully instantaneously 
flexible, regardless of how well agents are infonmed about the nature of the policy 
actions". While the microeconomic underpinnings of short-tenm wage and price 
�ckiness are typically based on the existence of some reason which makes it 
costly for agents to change prices continuously in an imperfect-competition setting, 
11 These policy implications "Were originally developed by lucas (1973), Sargent and Wallace (1975) and Barro 
1'976). 2 SeeL!Or example, the Taylor-tyJ?e rules estimated by Taylor (1993), and Clarida, Gali arid Gertler (1997), which track lne evolutkin of short-term Interest rates quite wen. 1S The empirical dominance of the systematic part is discussed, for example, by leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) and 
McCallum (1999). 
•• While some of the short·term effects of monetary policy on the economy can also be gel'l8raled in a flexible· price environment by the existenoe of certain restrictions which limit the ability of economic agents to make 
financial transactions -as, for example in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1�J these e�lanafions are not so well suited for understanding the d¥namlcs of monetary policy etrects on output allll prices. This is why we do not 
deal with such "limited participation models in the paper. 
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and while several such reasons may be debatable, we do seem actually to observe 
that wages and prices are not fully instantaneously flexible, due to the presence of 
long-tenm contracts, etc." As Solow once put i� while we do not understand why 
giraffes have very long necks, for practical purposes it is considerably more 
reasonable to assume that this is indeed the case rather than to assume that they 
have short necks. 
Once the introduction of short-term wage and price nominal rigidities is 
allowed, then it follows that both systematic and unsystematic monetary policy 
actions will have a temporary effect on output Yet, � will still be the case that as 
wages and prices fully adjust over time, output will come back to its starting level. 
According to Blanchard and Wolters (1999), "hysteresis" effects may be present 
and thus, under certain circumstances, there may be a permanent effect on output. 
Nevertheless, we consider as much more plausible that monetary policy affects 
output in a prolonged fashion but not permanentiy unless the rate of inflation is 
penmanently increased, in which case there will be penmanent economic costs. 
Thus, the policy implications from the 'imperfect price flexibility' school are twofold: 
monetary policy actions temporarily impact output regardless of whether they are 
systematic or not; and the choice of policy rule by the monetary authority is relevant 
for the short-run course of both prices and output. 
Moreover, � should be reCognised that not only nominal price and wage 
rigidities but also teal or, in general, structural rigidfties are important for assessing 
how monetary policy impacts the economy. Indeed, if we lived in a wo�d where only 
real or structural rigidities were present, this would imply that monetary policy were 
totally powe�ess to have any transitory effect on real output, merely affecting 
wages and prices instantaneously without modifying real wages or any other 
relative price in the economy. Interestingly, in such an extreme setting, the policy 
implications would be rather similar to those of the "flexible price-imperfect 
information- school. However, if it were the case, as seems much more likely, that 
nominal and real rigidities do coexist, then the policy implications turn out to be 
1$ The traditional references are Fischer 119771 , Phelps and Taylor (1977) and Taylor (1979). "Menu costs· were 
o�inally put forward by Akerlof and YeRen ( 985) and Mankrw (1985). See also Caplin and Spulber (1987), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), and Ball and Romer (1991). 
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qualitatively similar to those of the "imperfect price flexibility" school". For this 
reason, in the rest of the paper we group all rigidities under this school. 
Because things may not really be either black or white, as implied by the 
schools of thought reviewed above, it may be useful to come up with an integrated 
view more closely tailored to the actual needs of monetary policymakers. From this 
angle, the main implication of what was discussed in this section is that the more 
rapidly agents adjust their inflationary expectations and. the more flexibility there is 
in the setting of prices and wages, the greater the impact of systematic monetary 
policy actions on prices with lower or no temporary output effects. This is so 
because the better agents understand the policy pursued and the more confident 
they are that the authorities will stick to tt, the more intense and rapid will be the 
adjustment of expectations. And because, when goods markets are highly 
competitive and the labour market is flexible enough to permit the rapid adjustment 
of wages, prices will also respond faster and there will be lower output effects in the 
short term. In these Circumstances, it will also be the case that the capacity of 
monetary policy to influence real economic conditions will be increasingly limited to 
unexpected or unpredictable policy shifts. 
Finally, it could be argued that there are also a number of factors that have 
to be properly taken into account when studying the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy and which are aSSOCiated with the complexities of modem financial 
systems. Still, in our view, the stylised description provided so far in this section 
conceming the reasons why monetary policy may temporarily affect output captures 
the key issues to be borne in mind when analysing the empirical evidence and 
discussing its policy implications. For this reason, we now turn to discussing the 
empirical evidence on the short-term effects of monetary policy . 
• e See Goodfriend and King (1997) for a discussion of this issue. 
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2.3. Empirical evidenca on the short- tenn effects of monetary policy 
2.3.1 Existing Evidence 
The existing empiricallfferature that attempts to characterise the effects of 
monelary policy on the economy uses either structural or reduced-form models. In 
the first case it is sought to isolate the various channels of monelary policy 
transmission by specifying the agents' behavioural equations -like, for example, the 
consumption, investiment or wage equations-. In the second case, an attempt is 
made property to distinguish the unexpected component of monelary policy from 
other sources of uncertainty in the economy17. 
Central bank analysts usually rely on large macroeconometric models to 
study monelary policy effects. The multi-country model from the US-Federal 
Reserve Board (called FRB/MCM) is an example of this type of structural model". 
The model ensures its long-run slability by imposing convergence to a balanced 
growth path and makes explicit the treatiment of expectations for each of the G7 
countries considered. The monelary policy simulations carried out with the model 
suggest that output effects lake place within the first two years and are thus 
transitory. Although there are not large disparities among countries in the 
magnitude of these effects, it is true that the maximum occurs earlier in time in 
continenlal Europe than in the US and the UK: the peak effect on output is within 
the 4�-6� quarter in continental Europe and within the 6�-8� quarter in the US and 
UK. The maximum effects on inflation appear with a lag of a few quarters with 
respect to the maximum output effect and become insignificant after three years. 
The 'hump·shaped' pattern for output and the slower responses of prices 
obtained with the above model are also found by other models that incorporate 
some form of rational behaviour in the financial sector. In this vein, Taylor (1 993) 
also considers the existence of slaggered wage setting which implies that the 
expected excess demand in the economy affects the current course of wages. The 
relevant role played by forward looking behaviour in the model generates an output 
.7 See Friedman (1995) and Walsh (1998) for other reviews of the existing evidence. 
" The BIS (19951 conducted a study to analyse the transmiSSiOn of monetary policy that includes some simulation 
results under that FRBlMCM model and under other central bank models. 
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peak effect within the first year for most countries. Consistent with the FRB/MCM 
simulations, he also reports some,cross country differences in the impact and in the 
peak effect on output. 
While structural macroeconometric models usually have a very detailed 
description of the transmission mechanism, the way monetary policy is conducted 
may also influence how it impacts the economy. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997) 
estimated policy reaction functions for the G3 countries after 1979. They found that 
the data was consistent with a forward looking behaviour of policy where interest 
rates mainly respond to expected moves in inflation with some weight being also 
given to output changes. Moreover, this systematic behaviour tracks quite well the 
observed movements in actual short-term interest rates. This evidence is consistent 
with that discussed in Sims, leeper and Zha (1996) and in McCallum (1999), 
overall suggesting that the systematic part of policy accounts for most of the 
changes observed in monetary policy instruments, the role of policy shocks being 
rather minor. 
In a recent contribution, Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998) estimated 
monetary policy rules for six large European economies and measured their effect 
on output. Although they do not specify a complete model, since their goal is to 
ascertain whether monetary policy has different effects across the euro area, they 
control for two important effects: changes in intra-European exchange rates and 
simultaneity in the detenmination of monetary policy and output. Their results point 
to the existence of significant short-run output effects of the systematic part rather 
than the unanticipated part of the monetary policy. Contrary to the structural model 
results, they also find relevant cross-country differences over a two-year horizon in 
the output effects of systematic changes in interest rates. 
Vector Autoregressions (VARs) are reduced-fonm models that explicitly 
recognise the importance of the endogeneity of economic variables for studying the 
effects of monetary policy. The main analyses in this area have attempted to 
properly identify the unantiCipated disturbances that may be due to monetary policy 
from others sources of disturibance in the economy (i.e. supply shocks or real 
demand shocks). 
�18� 
The work by Sims (1992) presents evidence on the effects of monetary 
policy for the five largest OECD countries. The identification of the shocks needs to 
assume some informational restrictions among the contemporaneous actions of 
private agents and the central bank19. He finds that in all countries there are 
significant negative responses of output to positive innovations in interest rates. The 
size of those responses varies across countries but the sign and the form does not. 
Although the output response has a "hump-shaped" pattem, similar to that found 
with the structural models, it is more persistent. The paper also reports some 
responses that do not fit well with the usual textbook interpretation of the impact of 
money shocks. For instance, the responses of prices are initially positive or 
insignificant and only take negative values after a year or so (the SCH:alled "price 
puzzle")". 
An alternative way of identifying monetary policy shocks is to impose long­
run restrictions conSistently with a vertical Phillips Curve. Gerlach and Smets (1995) 
considered this type of identification in a VAR with output, prices and short-term 
nominal interest rates to isolate monetary shocks from aggregate demand and 
supply shocks for each of the G7 countries. Nevertheless, this alternative 
identification does not change the general message in terms of the effects of 
monetary policy actions on output and prices. 
More recent papers identifying monetary policy shocks have gone further in 
examining the implications of policy endogeneity. Sims (1992) originally suggested 
that 'price puzzles" could be explained by systematic pre-emptive responses of the 
monetary authority to inflationary pressures that were not considered in his VAR 
model. Grilli and Roubini (1996) and Kim (1996) considered innovations of interest 
rates as money supply shocks and identified them separately from money demand 
shocks. They also considered explicitly the possible contemporaneous responses 
of monetary policy to inflation expectations arising from exchange rates- or foreign 
commodity prices. Their results show that with such a structural identification the 
l' See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) for a recent overview of the identification of exogenous monetary 
shOCks and Cochrane (1998), 
:zo Furthellllore, on impact the domestic currency in some European countries depreciates instead of appreciating to be followed by a p8r$istent depreciation, These results are referred to as the 'exchange rate puzzle' and the 'taIWan:! discounfbias puzzle', ' 
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price puzzle disappears for most of the G-6 countries considered: after a monetary 
tightening, prices decline smoothly and significantly". 
Monetary policy operates in the structural models through a liquidity effect 
on the interest rates. That means, for example, that in the FRB/MCM model the 
cost-of-capital channel on investment is the most important channel of monetary 
policy transmission (along with the exchange rate that operates also via interest 
rate differentials). Moreover the size of this effect in the MCM model is comparable 
across the European countries and the US . . The theoretical literature has also 
defended a special role for credit as an additional channel of monetary transmission 
because of the existence of asymmetric information in the financial markets. The 
VAR results (see Bemanke and Blinder (1992)) show that after a positive innovation 
of interest rates, bank deposits initially decline more than bank loans but over time 
the decline in loans is larger. More importantly, as shown by Bacchetta and 
Ballabriga (1999) this behaviour seems to be very similar across all the European 
countries and the US but the s�e of the decline differs from country to country. 
All the VAR studies mentioned above found that monetary policy shocks, 
although they have significant short-term real effects, account for only a small 
fraction of output variability. A variance decompoSition of the forecast error at 
different horizons shows that, independently of the identification criteria or the 
selected information set, policy shocks do not account for more than 10% of the 
variations in output. Of course, this is an average across the selected sample 
period and thus it is possible to find certain periods in which such a pencentage is 
larger. Moreover, the studies across countries do not find significant differences in 
the importance of monetary policy shocks in explaining output. 
To summarise, the empirical evidence on the short-run effects of monetary 
policy is broadly the following: (a) there is a 'hump-shaped' pattern for output that 
reaches a maximum between the 4� and 8� quarters; (b) prices show a sluggish 
response with a maximum effect that appears later than the output effect; (c) the 
unanticipated component of monetary policy does not explain more than 10% of 
output variability; and (d) the diversity of institutional arrangements across countries 
21 In addition, exchange rates appreciate on impact followed by a continuous depreciation. 
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may induce differences in the size of the effects but those seem more readily 
identifiable with the systematic part than with the non-systematic part of monetary 
policy. 
2.3.2 Some new evidence 
Besides providing a compact summary of what we consider to be the more 
relevant existing evidence on the impact of monetary policy. in what follows we 
supply some further results using two alternative models: a widely-used European 
structural macroeconometric model, the National Institute Global Econometric 
Model (NIGEM) and a reduced-fonm model (VAR). The NIGEM model applies to an 
area made up of the EU11, so as to match the eura zone. The VAR models are 
estimated both for the euro area and the US. Although the exercise is based, in the 
case of the eure area, on historical estimations under a common monetary policy 
that did not exist before 1999 and are thus subject to the Lucas critique, the results 
may nevertheless be illustrative of what the average responses were. Moreover, 
while the structural model can be useful for addressing the consequences of both 
anticipated and non-anticipated monetary policy changes, the reduced-fonm VAR 
model can mainly shed some light on the latter. 
The simulations presented in Figure 3 use the NIGEM macroeconometric 
model. This model is characterised by forward looking financial markets and the 
existence of imperfectly flexible wages and prices in the short tenm. An important 
advantage of NIGEM is that although it separately models the national economies 
of the 11 countries in the euro zone. it can nevertheless be used to simulate the 
effects of a common monetary policy. 
The left hand side of Figure 3 shows the impact of a non-systematic 
monetary policy change on output and prices: from a baseline of fixed interest rates 
we assume an unexpected 1 % rise in short-term nominal interest rates that last for 
one year. Output and price responses in the eura area are a weighted average of 
the responses for each EU-11 country. As can be seen, output starts falling from 
the first quarter and reaches a maximum value between the 4th and 5th quarter; this 
effect becomes negligible after three years. In contrast. prices do not start falling 
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significantly until the second year and the maximum effects occur after the third 
year. 
The right hand side of Figure 3 shows the effects of a systematic monetary 
policy change: according to NIGEM, the policy rule of the ECB could be 
characterised as maintaining nominal stability through movements in its short-term 
nominal interest rate to the observed deviations from the objective. In this case, we 
assume that monetary policy responds to the inflationary pressures resulting from 
an autonomous consumption increase of 1 % during one year in all the eura 
countries. What we present in the figure are the differences in the economic impact 
of the shock depending on whether the policy rule is activated (thus making short­
tenm interest rates respond to the state of the economy) or not (whereby short-term 
interest rates remain constant). As observed in Figure 3, although the size effects 
are smaller than with an unanticipated interest rate change, the important 
observation is that the real output effects directly attributable to the monetary policy 
response occur later in time than in the non-anticipated case. Nevertheless, under 
both types of monetary policy actions, the output effect starts to disappear after the 
second year. 
We also provide altemative evidence from the estimation of a VAR model for 
the eura area as well as for the US. The purpose is to characterise the effects of an 
unanticipated monetary policy shock in both areas. The continuing lack of a 
sufficiently ample historical data base for the eura area as a whole limited us to 
including only the following aggregate variables in the model: output, prices, short­
term nominal interest rates, and M3 as the monetary aggregate". We also 
considered a world commodity price index as an additional variable to control for 
inflationary pressures from outside the area. For the US, we considered the same 
variables but using M1 as the relevant monetary aggregate. The sample period is 
1980:1-1998:4. 
We followed a 'classical' identification of the monetary shocks. The recursive 
structure assumes that the central bank observes current prices, both domestic and 
from abroad, as well as the current level of activity within the quarter before 
U The euro area data for output, prices and nominal interest rates has been laken from the BBV data base, and for 
M3 from the ECB. 
-22-
deciding the tone of monetary policy. Figure 4 shows the responses of interest 
rates, output and prices to an identified money supply shock in the US and in the 
EU-11. The shock is nonmalised to be equivalent to a percentage point interest rate 
change. 
As shown in Figure 4, an unexpected monetary tightening in the US leads 
to reductions in both output and prices. In particular, output starts falling after the 
second quarter and its maximum effect is in the 4th quarter, the effect vanishing 
after two years. Prices start falling smoothly after the 3'" quarter and the maximum 
drop appears in the second year. These results are consistent with those found in 
the literature, with alternative identifications and sample periods, and which are 
summarised above. 
The responses for the aggregated European variables to a common 
monetary policy shock appear in the right-hand column of Figure 4. While the 
magnitude of the responses differs from those observed in the US, the direction of 
the responses is nevertheless the same: both output and prices fall, with output 
responding in advance to prices. From this last piece of evidence it can be 
concluded that, based on the historical estimates presented, as far as the euro 
zone is concemed, monetary policy actions seems to have their maximum effect on 
output after the 6th to 10th quarters, this effect not lasting more than three years. As 
for prices, they adjust in a gradual manner, starting after the first year of the 
monetary policy impulses. Therefore, these tentative empirical results are broadly 
similar to those found in the literature by other studies for individual European 
countries. Compared to the US, the output impact of monetary policy in the euro 
zone seems to be quite smaller and to happen later, thus suggesting that the real 
effects of monetary policy actions are more limited in the European case23, The 
reasons why this is so are certainly worth exploring. 
23 Recently, Monticelii and Tristani (1999) have also noticed thai European inflation responds more persistently 
than in the US to monetary shocks. 
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2.3.3 What we know and what do not know about short tenn effects 
Although the empirical evidence reviewed does not claim to be exhaustive. it 
yields several results which are useful for central bankers when assessing the 
consequences of their policy decisions. 
Firstly, the international evidence both from structural and reduced-form 
models suggests that while monetary policy actions only influence nominal 
variables in the medium term, they nevertheless impact real variables in the short 
term, albeit with differing degrees of intensity across countries and economic areas. 
Secondly, following a mcnetary policy tightening output displays a "hump­
shaped" pattern". In particular, there seems to be a gradual decline in output which 
reaches its peak typically after 4 to 8 quarters, before it starts progressively to 
return to its original situation as prices adjust and/or the policy change is reversed. 
In general, a large part of the initial output effects disappear after 8 to 12 quarters. 
As far as prices are concerned, they respond with longer lags than output, the 
fullest effect on prices occurring with a lag of two years or longer. 
Thirdly, it seems that monetary policy actions have tranSitory output effects 
both when they reflect the systematic response of the authorities to the economy 
and when they correspond to exogenous policy shocks which depart from this 
pattern. Yet, at least for continental Europe, it is found that the output effects of 
systematic or anticipatied monetary actions take longer to be felt than those 
resulting from policy shocks. 
Fourthly, in practice it turns out that movements in monetary policy 
instruments typically correspond to responses by central banks to the state of the 
economy, exogenous policy shocks playing only a relatively small part. This feature 
-which reflects the prevalence of systematiC or expected policy changes relative to 
unexpected changes- should not come as a surprise once it is recognised that 
policy decisions are normally guided by the speCific monetary policy strategy with 
which the central bank tries to fulfil its final goal. 
:u In this section we take the example of a policy tightening. Clearty, the same results apply 10 a policy easing, 
although the directions in which variables move will be opposite. 
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Finally, in general, it seems reasonable to expect that the short-temn effects 
of monetary policy on output will be smaller, the higher the credibility of the 
monetary authority and the degree with which private-sector expectations adjust, 
and the faster the adaptation of wages and prices to the changing monetary 
conditions. 
In principle, these results appear to be quite reasonable and in fact may not 
be that far from what central bankers of many countries consider, based on their 
actual experience, to be a plausible description of reality. Still, beyond this it would 
be much harder to find any agreement concerning what the precise timing and 
magnitudes of the output and price effects of monetary policy are. As is well known, 
monetary actions are transmitted with relatively long and variable lags which differ 
not only across countries but also across time. In particular, the 'typical' responses 
estimated by econometric models correspond to the nomnal conditions prevailing in 
the economy over relatively long periods of time. Consequently, they may not be 
applicable under specific or new circumstances which depart, in one way or 
another, from what is considered to be nomnal from a historical perspective. 
Furthermore, even the more widely acceptable empirical regularities which 
were listed earlier have to be used cautiously in a policy environment since they 
come from econometric models with certain limitations. As is well known, structural 
models generally rely on a priori assumptions on how the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy works which may artificially bias the estimated responses of 
output and prices to official interest rate changes. Furthermore, such models are 
subject to the Lucas critique and are in general not prepared to handle issues 
relatied to the credibility of monetary policy which, in practice, are of fundamental 
importance for how private agents respond to the policy change. As concems 
reduced-fomn models, while they are well suited for giving infomnation mainly on the 
impact of the non-systematic part of monetary policy, the economic interpretation of 
the policy simulations pertomned with such models frequently relies on a priori 
assumptions on 'what precedes what' that are debatable and which, if changed, 
may modify the simulated responses in significant ways. Finally, policy exercises 
perfomned with these models may be qu�e sensitive to the specific set of economic 
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variables considered, the addition of an extra variable often having important effects 
on the results". 
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF MONETARY POLICY 
After having reviewed the evidence on the impact of monetary policy on the 
economy we now turn to discussing the implications which follow from the less 
controversial aspects of such evidence for the conduct of monetary policy in today's 
wo�d. The focus is on whether the existence of short-run real effects can and 
should be exploited by central banks, and on what adaptations should be made to 
take into account how differenUy monetary policy may operate in a low inflation, low 
interest rate environment. 
3,1, Can and should the existence of short-run real effects be 
exploited by monetary policymakers? 
Although our summary of the international evidence concluded that 
monetary policy generally influences the short-run behaviour of real variables -albeit 
with an intensity which varies Significantly across countries and, presumably, also 
depending on circumstances-, caution should be exercised when extracting policy 
implications. 
On the one hand, knowledge about the existence of tranSitory real effects 
from monetary policy actions can and should be used by central banks -albeit 
prudently- for steering monetary conditions, so that price stability over the business 
cycle is maintained and, without prejudice to it, economic activity is promoted 
whenever necessary. Yet policymakers have to take into account the uncertainties 
surrounding the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the economy, so as 
to avoid any sort of fine-tuning nor the well-known problems of instrument 
instability. If the central bank succeeds in prudently conducting monetary policy, the 
outcome will be an environment of price stability which is conducive to growth. 
2S See Friedman (1995) and Walsh (1998), among others, for a critique of structural i1nd reduced-fonn models. 
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An entirely different matter, however, is whether the evidence on the short­
run effects of monetary policy on output can be used to achieve, through an 
expansionary policy, a consistently higher output level or growth rate, on average, 
than warranted by potential. Here, the answer is certainly 'no'26. Indeed, even if the 
continuous pursuit of a more expansionary monetary policy stance than would be 
required to maintain price stability can at best stimulate output temporarily, it leads 
for sure to higher inflation which -as discussed in Section 2.1- entails significant 
permanent economic costs. 
In principle, recognition of this outcome should be enough to deter any central 
bank from conducting monetary policy in an activist manner. Still, to make sure that 
the risks of engaging in such inappropriate policy are minimised, in recent years � has 
been deemed advisable to do something to counter the other factors which also 
contribute to exacerbate temptations in this domain. In this connection, in addition to 
the pleas by central banks to the economic authorities for them to remove the 
structural rigidities and distortions hindering an appropriate wor1<ing of goods and 
labour mar1<ets -something which applies particula�y in the European context-, recent 
changes in central banking legislation in many countries -and particula� in Europe­
have placed price stabil� as the primary goal of monetary policy and have given the 
central bank full independence to effectively pursue this goal". These principles -
which are enshrined, for example, in the Statute of the European Central Bank- seek 
to avoid the risks of short-term subordination of price stabil� to other policy goals, and 
allow monetary policy decisions to be adopted with a sufficiently long horizon and 
independently of the political cycle. 
To conclude, a sensible reading by central bankers of the evidence on the 
short and medium-term impact of monetary policy would be that while the medium­
term monetary stance must be set conSistently with the maintenance of price stability, 
this does not preciude exercising a certain margin of flexibility to respond to 
macroeconomic disturbances in the short run, provided this does not jeopardise the 
primary goal of price stabil�. An important practical question is which strategiC policy 
framewor1< best aocomplishes these aims. 
: The seminal contributions In this literature are Kydl@nd and Prescott (1977), and Barro and Gordon (1983). 
See, for example, Goodhart and Vil'ials (1994). 
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3.2. Implications for ·monetary policy practice 
At the risk of oversimplifying what has proven to be an arduous and complex 
process in many countries, recent developments in monetary policy strategies may be 
said to have been mar1<ed by the endeavour to find a framewor1< capable of blending 
rigour and discipline in the medium-term monetary policy stance with certain margins 
of fiexibility to respond to macroeconomic disturbances in the short run. 
This endeavour of monetary authOrities reflects the desire to avoid two sorts 
of difficulties. On the one hand, the dynamic inconsistency problems arising from 
an excessively discretionary management of monetary policy, which ·as explained· 
make it virtually impossible to achieve and maintain price stability. And, on the 
other, the drawbacks associated with fixed or rigid rules which, by predetermining 
the course of monetary variables, leave no scope for monetary policy to play the 
welfare-improving role of reacting to certain macroeconomic disturbances. 
While this "search for the lost nominal anchor" has already crystalised out into 
the widespread acceptance that price stability should be the primary goal of monetary 
policy and that the centrial bank should be granted independence to effectively pursue 
this goal, this commonly accepted institutional framewor1< is nevertheless 
complemented by a�emative strategic framewor1<s in different countries and monetary 
areas. This is reflected, for example, in the 'implicit' striategy chosen by the Fed, the 
direct inflation targeting strategy of the UK, Canada and Sweden, the monetary 
targeting striategy which prevailed until recently in Germany, and the stability-<>riented 
striategy adopted by the European Centrial Bank. Still, while formally different, in 
practice the central banks which follow these a�emative striategies look at broadly 
similar sets of information variables and make interest rate decisions that are rather 
similar when faced with similar economic circumstances28. Lastly, some features 
which are common to all these strategies can be rationalised in terms of the empirical 
evidence which was provided ea�ier in the paper. 
A first such feature is that all of these striategies are forward looking, in the 
sense that policy reacts in anticipation of prospective economic developments. This is 
28 On this issue, see EMI (1997). Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997) and Laubach and Posen (1997) 
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only natural once � is recalled that monetary policy affects prices gradually, so that it 
becomes important to react .,;th enough lead-time, for example, to changes in the 
price outiook so as to avoid a future departure from price stability in ..;hichever 
direction. Furtllermore, since in practice recessions are very often preceded by 
significant increases in inflation, keeping inflation from rising through an appropriate 
forward-looking use of monetary policy is of paramount importance so as to have, on 
average, more stable output and employment conditions. Indeed, it is the view in most 
central banks that interest rates should be adjusted in a timely manner whenever there 
are signs of persistent inflationary pressures, so as to avoid having to increase such 
rates by larger amounts later on, .,;th the correspondingly higher output costs. Yet, a 
well-known practical problem is that ..;hat may be clear to the central bank may not be 
so apparent to the public � inflation has not yet risen. Consequently, to avoid the risk 
of delaying taking the appropriate policy measures for fear of them not being socially 
understood nor aooepted it is most important that central banks explain in a clear and 
transparent manner the reasons why the measures are being taken. 
A second feature is that central banks typically tend to adjust monetary 
instruments gradually, so as to avoid sudden reversals, for example, in the path of 
interest rates. This is consistent .,;th the by now generally aooepted empirical finding 
that most monetary policy actions consist of smooth responses to the state of the 
economy rather than exogenous policy sh�". Were the latter to prevail instead, it 
would be frequent to encounter sudden increases in interest rates followed by sudden 
decreases, rather than the gradualistic interest rate movements ..;hich are observed in 
real�, and ..;hich are furtllermore consistent ";th the relatively smooth course of 
prices and output over the business cycle. 
A final feature is that ..;hile all these strategies are firmly oriented in the 
medium term to the maintenance of price stabil�, in the short term they also adapt 
somev.;hat flexibly to respond to macroeconomic disturbances ..;hich affect output. 
This would be warranted, for instance, insofar as central banks' objectives included 
the promotion of output on an equal footing .,;th, or subordinated to, price stabil�. 
Moreover, even for those central banks ..;hich have price stabil� as their only goal, it 
";11 always be appropriate to take into account the behaviour of real variables -like 
ZI On the variety of reasons which may behind the interest rate smoothing observed in practice see Brainard (1967). Goodfnend (1991). Goodhart (1996), Blinder (1998), and Woodford (1999) 
- 29 -
output- when deciding whether official interest rates ought to be adjusted, since such 
behaviour is generally informative about the price outlook". Indeed, since the 
empirical evidence suggests that, in general, output adjusts somewhat faster than 
prices in the presence of demand shocks -and, in particular, of monetary shocks-, the 
course of output may signal to policymakers with some anticipation how prices may 
move later on. This would help in assessing whether further official interest moves are 
likely to be needed to reach the intended price objective. 
While it is of interest to note that there are key features common to the various 
monetary policy strategies employed in different countries and that -as ea�ier 
mentioned- central banks tend to look at broadly comparable sets of information and 
make interest rate decisions that are broadly similar when faced with similar 
circumstances, rt would be mistaken to conclude that the artemative monetary policy 
strategies are equally effective. Indeed, given the imperfect knowiedge that we have 
on how the economy wor!<s, the most surtable strategy will be that which, while 
adopting a medium-term perspective, tends to wor!< well across different models of the 
economy, can cope with shocks from different sources, and can be clearly and 
transparently communicated to the public, thus effectively anchoring price 
expectations. 
3.3. Some uncertainties regarding the impact of monertary policy in a 
low inflation, low Interest rate environment 
The policy issues discussed so far in the paper have been addressed 
bearing in mind the empirical regularities characterising the workings of the 
economy in the past. Yet central banks of industrial countries are faced at present 
with the challenge of having to conduct policy in an environment of low or very low 
inflation and interest rates. While in the case of the US this challenge must be met 
in the context of a very dynamic economy, in the euro area growth is envisaged to 
be rather more subdued. In Japan, in contrast, not only are interest rates extremely 
low but the economy remains depressed and prices are actually falling. 
Consequentily, it becomes very important for central bankers to ascertain to what 
extent monetary policy actions can be trusted to have similar effects in the short 
)0 On this issue, see Vickers (1998), King (1998) and Svensson (1999). 
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term to those observed in normal times in the present environment of low inflation 
and interest rates. 
Certainly, the concept of a "liquidity trap" is an old one. Sbll, it may be 
worthwhile to revisibng it in a context such as that faced today by central bankers, 
characterised by the existence of considerably sophisticated financial mar1<ets and 
globalisation. For this reason, and without wishing to engage in a full discussion of 
what is certainly a complex issue, in what follows we try to speculate on how such 
an environment may influence what are typically regarded as the main blocks of the 
monetary transmission mechanism. In doing so, we discuss the transmission of 
movements in official interest rates to mar1<et interest rates, the effect of changes in 
market interest rates on private spending, and the impact of spending on prices and 
output. 
Starting with the impact of official interest rates on market rates, it is widely 
recognized that movements in official rates impact the economy all the more the 
fuller their repercussion on the various maturities of the term structure of interest 
rates and, ultimately, on long-term rates. Thus, insofar as both short-term nominal 
and real interest rates and inflation are considered by markets to be at historical 
lows in a context, for example, of sluggish economic growth, a further interest rate 
cut may not trigger as significant a reduction in long-term yields -and could in some 
cases even generate increase- if markets perceive this cut to be the last one or 
likely to be reversed in the future. On the other hand, the impact of, say, an interest 
rate cut on the term structure will generally also depend on how credible the 
monetary policy is in the eyes of mar1<et partiCipants. Thus, if price stability were 
sufficiently well established so as to make mar1<ets confident that central bank 
actions were always in line with the maintenance of price stability, they would 
regard the interest rate change as sustainable and would not raise their inflationary 
expectations. Consequently, one would expect the downward movement in the term 
structure of nominal and real interest rates to be larger compared to a situation 
where price stability were absent to begin with or not yet suffiCiently consolidated. 
Which of these two opposing forces may prevail remains an open question worthy 
of further study. 
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As concerns the banking system, lending interest rates might respond less 
to a cut in official rates in an environment where inital rates are already very low 
and there is no room for deposrt rates to fall much further {in fact, many forms of 
deposit are remunerated at zero or close to zero rates}. The reason is that, in such 
a case, an interest rate cut could make banks much more reluctant to decrease 
lending rates for fear of excessively squeezing net interest margins and eroding 
profitability. 
There may also be specific environments characterised by very low nominal 
and real interest rates and depressed -rather than sluggish- economic conditions 
where further cuts in interest rates, even � still possible without turning negatve, 
might be qurte ineffectve in stmulating the economy through the interest rate 
channel. This would be the case, in particular, if there were severe problems in the 
banking system making banks extraordinarily reluctant to lend to the public given 
the considerable credrt risks involved. While this does not refute the fact that a 
monetary easing may still stimulate spending by inducing, for example, an 
eXChange rate depreciation which boosts exports, the total size of such stimulus will 
likely be smaller since the tiraditional interest rate effects will not directiy help 
demand due to the existence of a "credit crunch". 
In a low interest rate environment there is also the question of whether -for a 
given impact of the official interest rate change on market rates- the repercussions 
on private spending may differ from what would happen under other circumstances. 
Specifically, whenever the starting cost of capital is already sufficiently low, it may 
be hard to find investment projects that are not undertaken to begin with but which 
would be were the cost of capital to fall further. Therefore, a given size reduction in 
official interest rates, starting from a very low level, might stimulate private spending 
by less than � the starting situation had been characterised by the prevalence of a 
higher cost of capital. 
In tum, the way that a given change in spending is split into price and output 
changes may also depend on the initial inflation rate. In this regard, it has been 
pOinted out that, as inflation reaches progressively lower values it becomes harder 
and harder to reduce rt further, implying that the short-term Phillips Curve becomes 
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flatter at low rates of inflation". While this assumption is broadly supported by the 
experience of those countries which underwent disinflationary processes starting 
from high or very high inflation rates, it nevertheless remains very controversial as 
concerns the experience of industrial countries, which started their disinflation 
processes from significanHy lower inflation rates. Certainly, the experience of 
various European countries -like Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece- in recent years 
shows that reducing inflation even from moderate rates has not been costlier than 
in previous disinflation episodes; quite the contrary, although it has to be 
recognised that favourable supply shocks may have helped. Still, it is worth 
studying further whether the existence of low inflation rates -likes those prevailing 
today- may affect in other ways the short-term impact of monetary policy on the 
economy, and also the extent to which things may differ depending on whether the 
low inflation environment is more or less consolidated. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that the actual effects of monetary policy 
on the economy may also differ depending on whether the policy move involves an 
easing or a tightening of monetary conditions; something which Milton Friedman 
referred to a long time ago when saying that 'You can pull a string but cannot push 
if. In this regard, it is worth noting that the reasons put forward in this section 
concerning why an easier monetary policy may not be as effective in stimulating 
demand in a context of low interest rates and a sluggish or depressed economy, 
also suggest that a policy tightening -were it to be required to preserve price 
stability in a more dynamic economic setting- may still be quite effective in slowing 
down the pace of demand. In particular, an official interest rate increase will more 
readily be reflected in higher lending rates -which reduce the demand for loans-, it 
will lead to a contraction in the actual supply of loans, and the higher cost of capital 
will dent private spending. As concerns the split of the resulting changes in 
spending into prices and output, insofar as wages and prices tend to show a higher 
degree of flexibility in an upward than in a downward direction due, for example, to 
the desire of economic agents to avoid losses in their real incomes, the demand 
" See Akerlof, Oid<.ens and Perry (1997). 
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stimulus from a monetary easing may be reflected less in output increases, and the 
demand contraction from a tightening may be reflected more in output decreases". 
To summarise, this section has sought to explain how the short-term impact 
of monetary peliey on the economy may differ in specific circumstances like those 
prevailing today, which depart from those observed, on average, during the period 
over which such impact was observed or estimated with the help of more or less 
sophisticated econometric models. Since this may influence significantly the 
absolute and relative sizes of the short-run effects on output and prices, it shows 
how impertant it is that when making peliey decisions central banks take fully into 
account not just what the current state of the economy is and what forces are 
shaping it but also the envisaged direction of the peliey move. This notwithstanding, 
on the basis of the reasoning put forward it may be concluded that, in the present 
environment of low inflation and interest rates, a monetary policy easing may 
actually be less effective in promoting economic activity than under different 
Circumstances, even when such a move does not jeopardise price stability. 
However, this is a highly speculative conclusion that needs to be further scrutinised. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has tried to deal with an old issue which nevertheless continues to 
be of great relevant for central bankers: the impact of monetary peliey on the 
economy. The empirical evidence discussed in the paper suggests that since, over 
the medium term, inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon and entails 
significant economic costs, the best contribution that monetary peliey can make to 
society's welfare is to maintain price stability. Still, over the short-term, monetary 
poliey seems to affect real economic variables regardless of whether policy moves 
are systematic respenses to the state of the economy or exogenous shocks, 
presumably as a result of the coexistence of nominal and real rigidities. 
While these general results appear quite reasonable, beyond this it would be 
much harder to find any agreement concerning what the precise timing and 
magnitudes of the output and price effects of monetary poliey are over the short-
:a;! Cover (1992) and Garcia and Schaller ( 1995).provide evidence in favour of the hypothesis that monetary policy impacts output more when it lightens than when it eases. 
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term. From a central bankers viewpoint, a sensible reading of the evidence would 
be that while the medium-term monetary stance must be set consistently with the 
maintenance of price stability, this does not preclude central banks prudently 
exercising a. certain margin of flexibility to respond to macroeconomic disturbances 
in the short-run, provided this does not jeopardise the primary goal of price stability. 
Finally, our discussion of the potential uncertainties surrounding the 
impact of monetary policy in a low inflation, low interest rate environment -like that 
prevailing today in many countries and economic areas- reaches the highly 
tentative conclusion that a monetary policy easing may become less effective in 
promoUng economic activity in that context, even when such a move does not place 
at risk the maintenance of price stability. An implication of the above would be that, 
in the present circumstances, monetary policy should not be overburdened with the 
responsibility of solving problems which are better tackled through other policies 
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